This paper focuses on mortgage supply and its contribution to the loan-to-value (LTV)-ratio. The paper starts by finding the optimal LTV-ratio for a profitmaximising mortgagee that supply mortgages using housing as collateral. As the LTV-ratio represents the mortgagee's risk exposure, the optimal LTV-ratio is one where the mortgagee is paid for its actual risk exposure. Thinking in terms of social welfare, the profit-maximising LTV-ratio is also optimal for society in our supply side framework. When including additional characteristics from the supply side of the mortgage market, the paper shows how the profitmaximising LTV-ratio varies according to moral hazard, risk pricing, funding structures, lending volumes and collateral values. The supply side characteristics create a wedge between the profit-maximising LTV-ratio and the LTV-ratio optimal for society. The model helps understand the role of mortgage supply in the period preceding the financial crisis, where LTV-ratios increased considerably. Consequently, it also allows for straightforward arguments regarding macro-prudential policy. Highlighting risk exposure, the paper continues by analysing the risk pricing response to falling house prices and an LTV-ratio that exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination. The paper finds a kinked-relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio ex post, separating risk pricing ex ante and ex post. appreciation exceeds wage growth, there is the need to borrow a larger share of the price of a dwelling, stimulating the demand for higher LTV-ratios.
Introduction
Why do loan-to-value (LTV)-ratios vary across countries and periods, and why did so many countries see higher LTV-ratios in the period preceding the financial crisis? In answering this, the literature on LTV-ratios has been extensive. Some papers see the LTV-ratio as an exogenous variable determined by government regulation. Others allow for an endogenous LTV-ratio derived from the interaction between the supply side and the demand side of mortgage markets. Demand side factors are obviously important for variations in the LTV-ratio. A young population might, for instance, demand higher LTV-ratios than an older population with a history of savings and accumulated equity. In addition, in economies where housing The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we relate the model to the prevailing literature. In section three, we present the model. The fourth section relates (sequentially) the LTV-ratio to moral hazard, risk pricing, funding, lending and collateral. The fifth part derives the kinked-relation between the LTVratio and the mortgage rate. The last part concludes.
Related literature and the model set-up
Deriving the LTV-ratio from the supply side of mortgage markets, and seeing it as a measure of a mortgagee's risk exposure, is an alternative to the approach interpreting the (inverse of the) LTV-ratio as an indicator of how developed a mortgage market is (see, for instance, Jappelli and Pagano 1989) .
Variations in the LTV-ratio are seen both over time and across markets. Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) report that LTV-ratios differ from 50 per cent in Italy to 112 per cent in the Netherlands, while Amior and Halket (2014) show variations in LTV-ratios across US cities. In particular the latter kind of LTV variation is difficult to relate to the degree of mortgage market depth.
This paper sees the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee and draws on the framework of Keeley (1987, 1989) and Keeley (1990) . Taking external funding into account, the paper shows (conventionally) how declining capital-to-asset ratios and favourable deposit insurance schemes impact positively on a mortgagee's risk exposure and, hence, the optimal LTV-ratio. The model also shows how moral hazard and risk pricing impact the LTV-ratio.
The supply side focus allows us to highlight the endogenous credit constraint of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . While higher collateral values stimulate lending, there is a positive feedback effect from lending to house prices and collateral values. Such bidirectional causality between house prices and mortgage volumes is, for instance, shown by Anundsen and Jansen (2013) or Sophocles and Vlassoppulos (2009) . Like Pavlov and Wachter (2011) and Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2012) , we allow for a positive impact from credit supply on house prices. Our credit supply approximation is the prevailing LTV-ratio, argued by Englund (2011) as a better indicator of credit supply than, for instance, the more commonly used credit volume, which is influenced by both the supply and the demand sides of mortgage markets. Kim (2007) relates the LTV-ratio to the price-rent ratio and Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2011) show that incorporating the LTV-ratio into the price-to-rent ratio helps overcome the problem related to the fact that most US house price model breaks down in the mid-2000s. Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010) are however one of the few who have explicitly linked the LTV-ratio to house prices empirically. The paper finds a long-term elasticity of house prices with respect to the LTV-ratio for first-time buyers2 h 0:8; 1:1 i. Mian and Sufi (2011) show how housing appreciations might stimulate lending both from existing homeowners and, by allowing a 'financially riskier' set of new home buyers to enter the mortgage market, from first-time entrants. The entry of 'financially riskier' households into owner-occupation is also the focus of Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010) . Analysing the guidelines given by the US congress to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regarding increased funding of low down-payment (and high LTV) mortgages, they find new entry and increased homeownership rates as a main result. That higher LTV-ratios are accompanied by increased lending is another important finding of the paper. In our framework we distinguish between the effects from entry into homeownership and the effects from existing homeowners by relating both collateral values and mortgage volumes to the LTV-ratio. The positive relation between the LTV-ratio and mortgage volumes is assumed to capture the effect of a higher LTV-ratio on entry into homeownership. A higher lending volume has a positive impact on mortgagee operating income and, as mortgagor debt increases, on loss given default. While the former stimulates mortgagee risk taking and the LTV-ratio, the impact from the latter is negative, making the total effect on the LTV-ratio ambiguous. To highlight the impact from existing homeowners we allow for a positive relation between the LTV-ratio and collateral. As appreciations reduce losses in case of default, there is a positive relation between the optimal LTV-ratio and collateral values.
Presenting a model that incorporates moral hazard, risk pricing, external funding (and the accompanying regulations) and the positive relations between the LTV-ratio and lending volumes and collateral values, respectively, brings a number of factors that might cause variations in the LTV-ratio both over time and across markets onto the same playing-field. This playing-field allows us to analyse how macro-prudential policy, be it credit-or capital-related instruments, may be applied to constrain the LTV-ratio and the risk exposure of mortgagees (see Borio, Furfine, & Lowe 2001 for a seminal introduction to macro-prudential policy).
Our endogenous LTV-ratio is supply side driven. A supply side focus to LTV follows the reasoning of Wong, Tsang, and Kong (2014) analysing Macro-prudential policy and suggesting that LTV-caps have stronger effects on the supply side than the demand side of mortgage markets.
Analysing supply side developments, financial innovations are important. Duca et al. (2010) relate the rise in LTV-ratios between 2000 and 2005 to two types of financial innovation originating on the supply side: credit scoring technology that enabled sorting and pricing of non-prime mortgages as well as funding of such loans using collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs).
Instead of focusing on changes in LTV-ratios driven by improved mortgagee efficiency, Borgersen and Robertsen (2012) show that when regulations are insufficient market developments, in particular expectations of continued collateral appreciation, might impact LTV-ratios positively as expected loss given default decreases. Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) argue that mortgagees might supply higher LTV-ratios to fulfil nominal return targets. This paper extends this argument and derives the profit-maximising LTV-ratio where external funding, lending and collateral affects the LTV-ratio. Given the supply side nature of our model the optimal LTV-ratio for society is one where mortgagees are paid for their risk exposure. When incorporating funding, lending and collateral the profit-maximising LTVratio exceeds the LTV-ratio that the supply side should allow for when thinking in terms of social welfare. This is because higher mortgagee risk stimulates expected profit, and, using the terminology of Goodhart and Hoffman, makes it easier to fulfil nominal return targets. Integrating both supply and demand side effects Lin (2014) applies a monetary general equilibrium model and shows how debtor welfare is not monotonically increasing in the LTV-ratio and that the optimal LTV-ratio both for the debtor and for the creditor is one that allows for the possibility of ex post default. Several papers analyse the demand for LTV-ratios (see, for instance, Agarwal, Green, Rosenblatt, & Yao 2015: Allen & Carletti 2014; Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Scott, Frame, & Miller 2011) . When considering welfare, the demand side will obviously impact the optimal LTV-ratio for society. Demographics, for instance, will obviously matter, as a young population might need a higher LTVratio than an older population with higher savings and accumulated equity. How young adults demand higher a LTV-ratio (due to low levels of savings) is argued by, amongst others (Yang, 2009; Li & Yao, 2007) . The life-cycle adaption to housing markets is in general terms analysed by, for instance, Attanasio, Bottazzi, Low, Neisham, and Wakefield (2012) and Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) . In economies where housing markets are detached from the macro economy and housing appreciation exceeds wage growth for prolonged periods, the need to borrow more in order to enter owner-occupied housing will stimulate the demand for higher LTV-ratios (see, for instance, Borgersen, 2016) . Higher LTV-ratios might have repercussions in housing or mortgage markets, and Almeida, Campello, and Liu (2006) find both house prices and new mortgage borrowing to be more sensitive to shocks in countries with high LTV-ratios. The seminal paper highlights the interrelation between the motives for housing consumption and housing investments, complicating mortgage demand assessments (Brueckner 1997) .
Moving back to risk exposure, there are also links to the LTV-ratio from the demand side of mortgage markets. 1 Amior and Halket (2014) find a strong negative correlation between households' average LTV-ratio and house price volatility. Analysing short-term gains from different funding structures Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012) allow leverage gains to stimulate the demand for higher LTV-ratios. A side effect of higher LTV-ratios is increased risk exposure, where the degree of risk aversion among mortgagors will balance the expected leverage gain to mortgagor risk, and determine the optimal LTV-ratio.
Instead of focusing on either supply side or demand side effects on the LTVratio, Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) argue that market innovations following the financial reforms of the early 1980s, in particular the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, drastically reduced equity requirements associated with household borrowing. 2 Arguing that changes in equity requirements (and the corresponding LTV-ratios) follow regulatory changes, they treat equity requirements as exogenous policy choices. Linking variations in the LTV-ratio to the regulatory and legal framework is in accordance with Aherne, Ammer, Doyle, Kole, and Martin (2005) . As both capital-adequacy and deposit guarantee schemes impact LTV-ratios in our model, we follow this line of reasoning, while acknowledging that market developments might take precedence when regulations are insufficient.
Relating risk pricing to the Keeley (1987, 1989 ) framework, we apply a parallel to the option-pricing approach in the sense that the mortgagor's equity stake and the LTV-ratio at origination is a key element. Incorporating the current LTV-ratio our approach is along the extensions of Ciochetti, Gao, and Yao (2002) and others, while, as we abstract away from mortgagors cash-flow position, the model is positioned within the equity theory of default. 3 The equity theory is, for instance, the starting point of Das and Meadows (2013) analysing strategic default and highlighting the trade-off between future repayment and the probability of default that determines the optimal LTV-ratio.
Discussing risk-based mortgage pricing, Magri and Pico (2011) argue that few papers are concerned with risk based mortgage pricing while the ones that are centre around the US market. Bostic (2002) , for instance, argues that lenders, due to reduced storage costs for data and improved credit scoring techniques, started estimating the default risk of each borrower during the 90s. Recent US evidence is that easily collateralised household loans, such as mortgages, are those that have been most affected by these changes in pricing techniques (Magri & Pico, 2011 , p. 1277 .
The standard reference to the option-pricing literature on mortgages is Kau and Keenan (1995) while White (2004) provides an interesting supplement. For mortgage default explicitly, for instance, Elul, Souleles, Chomisisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) and Park and Bang (2014) argue that the measurement of credit risk involves three parameters: the possibility of default; loss-given defaults; and the correlation across defaults, where there are few studies of loss-given default. 4 Distinguishing between risk pricing ex ante and ex post the paper explicitly accounts for the two former effects, where we separate the effect of a higher probability of default from that of increased costs in the case of default. The model relates the latter to the change in the amount of collateralised debt that the distinction between the current LTV-ratio and the LTV-ratio at origination represents.
The mortgagee
We consider a mortgagee that takes on deposits D, for which it pays a deposit rater D . Deposits are conventionally insured by deposit insurance schemes (see, for instance, Kim, Kim, & Han 2014) The mortgagee balance sheet identity states that mortgage supply L is constrained by mortgagee equity K and the mortgagee's received deposits, L D D C K. The mortgagee uses housing as collateral for mortgages. The mortgagor (household) finances its purchase of a house with the value V by either equity E, or a mortgage L, giving the balance sheet identity V D L C E.
There is a probability p that the household may be able to pay back the mortgage and a probability 1-p that it may not. We refer to the case where the household is able to pay back a mortgage as success and the case where it may not as default.
In the absence of default, mortgagee profit is equal to the expected operating income pðr u L ¡ r D DÞ, where r u is the mortgage rate. The mortgagee accepts an LTV ratio λ D L V , which means that it -in case of default and with probability 1-pcovers its outstanding debt by the collateralised part of the housing value λV , equating profit in case of default to ð1 ¡ pÞð ¡ L C λV Þ.
Expressing a mortgagee's expected profit as a function of the LTV-ratio p D pðλÞ gives
In the forthcoming sections we relate the LTV-ratio to different components of the profit function to highlight their impact on the optimal LTV-ratio for a profitmaximising mortgagee.
Moral hazard
First, we introduce the probability of success as a decreasing function of the LTVratio, p D pðλÞ; p 0 ðλÞ < 0: This automatically implies that the probability of default 1 ¡ pðλÞ is increasing in the LTV-ratio. The higher the LTV-ratio the lower (higher) is the probability of success (default). The existence of moral hazard in credit markets motivates this argument (see, for instance, Demirg€ uç-Kunt & Detragiache 2002; Holmstrom & Tirole 1997). A higher LTV-ratio reduces (increases) the weight given to operating income (collateral) in the profit function. The elasticity s p D El pðλÞ D λ p ðλÞ Á p 0 ðλÞ À measures how the probability of success responds to a one per cent increase in the LTV-ratio. The elasticity is an indicator of the extent of moral hazard in the mortgage market. From the sign of the derivative we know that the elasticity of success (or stated differently -the moral hazard elasticity) has a negative value s p < 0:
Risk pricing Risk pricing is introduced by assuming a positive relation between the mortgage rate r u and the LTV-ratio r u ðλÞ where r 0 u ðλÞ > 0 (see, for instance, Kau and Keenan 1995 for the relation between the LTV-ratio and risk pricing). We assume deposits to be the only source of external funding, making the interest rate margin between the mortgage rate and the deposit rate. We simplify by assuming r D D 1 and equate the mortgage rate r u ðλÞ to the interest rate margin. We operationalise the risk pricing response r 0 u ðλÞto the risk increase associated with a higher LTV-ratio by introducing the risk pricing elasticity s r D El rðλÞ D λ r u ðλÞ = Þr u 0 ðλÞ À .
Mortgage volumes
We allow for a positive relation between the mortgage volume and the LTV-ratio LðλÞ where L 0 ðλÞ > 0. The argument is that a higher LTV-ratio makes more households able to fulfil the corresponding down-payment constraint and become mortgagors. As the number of mortgagors increase, so does aggregate lending. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010) argue for a positive relation between the LTV-ratio and mortgage volumes. The lending elasticity s L D El LðλÞ D λ L ðλÞ = ÞL 0 ðλÞ À measures the aggregate mortgage response to a one per cent increase in the LTV-ratio.
Collateral values
Finally, we allow for a positive impact from the LTV-ratio to house prices
measures the extent to which house prices respond to a one per cent increase in the LTV-ratio. The argument is part of the endogenous credit constraint of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , where the LTV-ratio represents the availability of credit. A positive relation between the LTV-ratio and house prices allows credit availability to impact positively on collateral values. 5
Two scenarios
We apply the model to consider two different scenarios derived from the relation between the LTV-ratio at origination and the current LTV-ratio (defined as the mortgage volume relative to the market value).
When the mortgage volume relative to the market value of the house falls short of (or is equal to) the initial LTV-ratio λV L , λ L V , the expected loss given default is equal to what it was at origination, and is correspondingly already priced in by the mortgagee.
When, on the other hand, the mortgage volume (relative to the market value of the house) exceeds the initial LTV-ratio λV < L , λ < L V there is a potentially higher default effect on expected profits than at origination. This risk increase is not priced in by the mortgagee and impacts risk pricing ex post.
The former scenario, where, below, we assume λ D L V , describes the situation at origination where mortgage contracts are signed, and is in the fourth section used to derive the optimal LTV-ratio. The latter scenario describes a situation where depreciations have lifted the current LTV-ratio above the LTV-ratio at origination. This scenario is used in the fifth section to analyse a mortgagee's risk pricing response to a housing depreciation and a corresponding increase in the risk exposure of a mortgagee.
The profit maximising LTV-ratio We consider a mortgagee at origination to find the profit maximising LTV-ratio. When deriving the optimal LTV-ratio we remember how λ D L V ) λV D L =
. At first, we abstract away from all but one of the presumed LTV-effects above, and then we include risk pricing, funding, lending and collateral sequentially.
Moral hazard : p D pðλÞ
Taking moral hazard into account, but abstracting away from all the other LTVeffects, we find the optimal LTV-ratio by taking the derivative of 1) with respect to λ(remembering that λV D L), as
This first-order condition dpðλÞ dλ D 0 reduces to r u L D D ð Þ , equalising operating income to zero. If the moral hazard problem is severe, and the probability of success drops significantly as the LTV-ratio increases (a high value on p 0 λ ð Þ), the mortgagee offers a low LTV-ratio λ L . If the moral hazard problem is small(er), it offers a higher LTV-ratio λ H . Figure 1 illustrates the situation where, for given values of both lending volumes and deposit volumes, as well as for the interest rate margin, the moral hazard technology differs across mortgagors. Figure 1 shows how the LTV-ratio will differ according to the risk profile of mortgagors. In the following, we however assume equal moral hazard technology across all mortgagors. 6
Risk pricing and funding : p D pðλÞ; r u ðλÞ and D0 or D D 0
We start by introducing two basic mortgagee characteristics, risk pricing and external funding. A higher LTV-ratio has now two effects on mortgagee profit as it both reduces the probability of success and, by lifting the mortgage rate, improves the interest rate margin.
To separate the risk pricing effect from that of funding we first abstract away from deposits, D D 0, to consider a mortgagee where lending is constrained by own equity. The optimal LTV-ratio is found by taking the derivative of 1) with respect to the LTV-ratio λ
Using the definitions of the moral hazard elasticity s p < 0 and the risk pricing elasticity s r , we rearrange the condition for dpðλÞ dλ D 0 as
Expression (4) defines (implicitly) the optimal LTV-ratio λ A as one where the response of risk pricing is equal to that of moral hazard when the LTV-ratio increases by one per cent. The profit maximising LTV-ratio is one where the mortgagee is paid for its actual risk exposure. Figure 1 . The relation between mortgagee profit and the optimal LTV-ratio for different moral hazard technologies among mortgagors.
To give our argument some purchase, we introduce welfare considerations and derive the socially optimal LTV-ratio in our supply side model. We define the socially optimal LTV-ratio as one that maximises a mortgagee's expected return max λ pðλÞr u ðλÞL. The first-order condition to this problem can be expressed as,
, which is easily derived from expression (3). The optimal LTV-ratio is, from a welfare point of view, equal to the LTV-ratio that comes about when lending is funded by mortgagee capital. The LTV-ratio λ A may be seen as the socially-optimal LTV-ratio in our supply side framework.
In the following, we include different supply side features to see how they create a wedge between the socially optimal LTV-ratio and the LTV-ratio maximising mortgagee profit.
We start by bringing funding back into the game and allow for D>0. The optimal LTV-ratio is again found by taking the derivative of (1) with respect to λ
After some rearranging, we find the condition for dpðλÞ dλ D 0 as
Here, the left hand side gives the marginal cost of a higher LTV-ratio and the right hand side the marginal gain. While the latter is related to the higher interest rate margin, the former is derived from the increased probability of default (and the reduced probability of success) that accompany a higher LTV-ratio.
Using the definition of s p we express the first-order condition as
where the optimal LTV-ratio is a function of the moral hazard elasticity, the interest rate margin, how tough risk pricing responds to increased risk exposure and the deposit-to-lending ratio. (The inverse of the deposit-to-lending ratio, i.e. L/D, is in our model equal to the capital-adequacy ratio.) 7 When operating income is positive, r u > D L = , the moral hazard elasticity, the capital-adequacy ratio and the degree of risk pricing impacts negatively on the LTV-ratio. The interest rate margin on the other hand impacts positively on the profit-maximising LTV-ratio.
Alternatively, we may express the first-order condition in terms of elasticities, which is congruent with the expression in the absence of external funding and is also the approach we pursue in the following ¡ s P D s r U r u ðλÞ r u ðλÞ ¡ D L : = (8)
To highlight the funding effect we compare the optimal LTV-ratio λ B derived from a situation with external funding to λ A , the optimal LTV-ratio in the absence of external funding. The assumption of equal moral hazard technology 8 allows us, using expressions (4) and (8), to see how
Expression (9) shows unambiguously a positive funding effect on the LTV-ratio λ B > λ A , as r u ðλÞ > r u ðλÞ ¡ D L = Þ À . When mortgagees fund lending using equity and deposits, lending may exceed mortgagee equity. When funding in part is external, and as in our case guarantee schemes insure deposits, a mortgagee does not carry all the risk associated with its lending activities. This funding structure stimulates rather conventionally, mortgagee risk taking and, hence, impacts positively on the profit-maximising LTV-ratio.
Mortgage volumes : p D pðλÞ; r u ðλÞ; LðλÞ and D > 0
The second extension we pursue is a positive relation between mortgage volumes and the LTV-ratio. As mortgagees accept higher LTV-ratios, more households are able to fulfil the (now) lower down-payment constraint and become mortgagors, stimulating lending.
When the lending effect is taken into account, a higher LTV-ratio has three effects on mortgagee profit: First, it reduces the probability of success. Second, it lifts the interest rate margin. Third, it increases mortgage volumes. Higher volumes introduce two effects on mortgagee profit; there is a positive impact on operating income and, as debt increases, so do the expected losses in case of default.
Taking the lending effect into account expression (1) equals
and the first-order condition is
After some rearranging the optimal LTV-ratio λ C is defined by
The left-hand side is, as s p < 0, positive. The right-hand side has three components. The first two components represent positive effects on operating income from a higher LTV-ratio, due to a higher interest rate margin and increased lending, respectively. The latter effect, which comes from higher debt and increased losses in case of default, depends on the probability ratio and the value of the lending elasticity (a feature to be discussed later). The effect is negative when lending is elastic with respect to the LTV-ratio s L > 1, and positive when lending is inelastic s L < 1.
To find the impact of mortgage volumes on the optimal LTV-ratio we compare expressions (9) and (12), and find
We see how λ B D λ C and that there is no lending effect on the LTV-ratio when
In this case the expected increase in operating income from higher lending is equal to the expected increase in loss given default. When the mortgage rate and the interest rate margin exceed a critical level ½r u > ð 1 ¡ p p Þ Â s L ¡ 1 ð Þ s L the former effect dominates, and there is a positive lending effect on the LTV-ratio λ C > λ B . 9
Collateral : p D pðλÞ; r u ðλÞ; LðλÞ; V ðλÞ and D > 0
The final extension is to take into account that a higher LTV-ratio impacts house prices and collateral values. Higher collateral values reduce expected losses in case of default and might therefore stimulate LTV-ratios. Taking the collateral effect into account the expression for mortgagee profit equals
and the first-order condition is found from
When rearranging the first-order condition in terms of elasticities we find the expression that defines the optimal LTV-ratio in the presence of a collateral effect λ D as
Comparing λ D to the optimal LTV-ratio in the absence of collateral effects λ C gives
When a mortgagee's operating profit is positive r u > D L = , and there is a probability for moral hazard in the mortgage market p 2 h 0; 1 i , a positive collateral elasticity will produce a positive collateral effect on the profit maximising LTVratio λ D > λ C .
Seeing the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee allows us to see how the optimal LTV-ratio is affected by external funding-and the conventional arguments related to deposit insurance and capital-adequacy risk pricing, moral hazard, lending volumes and collateral values. As these mortgage market characteristics both vary across markets and over time they might contribute to context specific LTV-ratios. Figure 2, where λ A is the socially optimal LTV-ratio, pictures the effect on the optimal LTV-ratio from funding, lending and collateral. (We have assumed a positive lending effect).
Thinking in terms of policy, we see the kind of measures that are useful for reducing a mortgagee's risk exposure and the LTV-ratio. Credit-related instruments such as LTV-caps obviously constrain the LTV-ratio directly. Capital related instruments impact the LTV-ratio indirectly. As a higher deposit-to-lending ratio stimulates the funding effect, the lending effect and the collateral effect, tighter capital-adequacy rules are doing the opposite.
When house prices are driven by market fundamentals and not the endogenous credit constraint, the collateral effect is missing (This is a case where s V D 0Þ: A credit risk policy dominated by debt-servicing ability and the first-line of defence ensures such a scenario (Borgersen, 2016) .
Finally, policies to reduce the lending effect are contingent on the moral hazard intensity. In the absence of moral hazard ðp ! 0 Þ the lending elasticity that completely balances the effect of increased lending and higher operating income with the increase in debt, and loss given default that follows, is s L D 1. 10 When, on the other hand moral hazard is at its most extreme p ! 1 ð Þ, a mortgage policy that does not allow mortgage volumes to respond to higher LTV-ratios s L D 0 will do the same.
The risk pricing response to a fall in house prices
In this section, we analyse the risk pricing response to a fall in house prices. Seeing the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee, our framework allows for risk pricing assessments in relation to changes in the LTV-ratio. As we abstract away from mortgage demand we assume changes in house prices to be sudden, implicitly taking away a mortgagor's option to increase repayments. This allows changes in house prices to be passed through to the LTV-ratio and the current LTV-ratio to deviate from the LTV-ratio at origination. Figure 2 . The relation between moral hazard and the LTV-ratio where λ A is the socially optimal LTV-ratio. There is a funding effect λ B ¡ λ A , a lending effect λ C ¡ λ B and a collateral effect λ D ¡ λ C on the optimal LTV-ratio for a profit-maximising mortgagee.
We consider a case where, due to falling house prices, the current LTV-ratio exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination, λV < L , λ initial < L V λ new : A higher LTVratio increases the risk exposure of a mortgagee compared to at origination, and this risk increase is not priced in by the mortgagee. The mortgagee optimisation includes ex post what we refer to as a default effect. 11 We start by introducing the derivative of expression (1), which now has to take into account that λV < L. The first-order condition is
We consider a house price fall DV < 0 which lifts the current LTV-ratio λ new above the LTV-ratio at origination λ initial , where we assume λ new D λ initial ð1 C aÞ and a > 0. When rearranged, the first-order condition can be expressed as
The deposit-to-lending ratio gives the interest rate margin (or equivalently using our simplifications, the mortgage rate -which is the term we use in the following to highlight the risk pricing argument) necessary for zero net-operating profit. The first term is the break-even condition. The second term relates the mortgage rate to a mortgagee's risk exposure at origination. This ex ante relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio λ initial is positive, as s P < 0. The latter two terms represent the default effect, measuring the additional risk exposure of a mortgagee that accompanies a house price fall and an LTV-ratio that exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination. The increased risk exposure is both due to a higher probability of default and due to increased cost in case of default.
The relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio is pictured in Figure 3 , where the ex post relation differs from the ex ante relation. The risk exposure of a mortgagee is, when a D 0 and λ initial D λ new , assessed by the initial mortgage contract (ex ante). At origination the mortgagor has been offered an LTVratio λ initial for which she pays a mortgage rate r Initial
The positively sloped line starting at the break-even condition (a mortgage rate equal to the D/L-ratio) shows that the higher the LTV-ratio at origination, the higher also the mortgage rate.
The default effect comes into play when λ new > λ initial and a > 0. 12 As house prices have fallen, and the risk exposure of a mortgagee has increased, additional effects come into play in a mortgagee's risk assessments. These effects create a kinked-relation between the mortgage rate and the mortgagee's risk exposure ex post.
First of all, a housing depreciation impacts positively on the mortgage rate due to the higher risk exposure among mortgagees λ initial < λ new , an effect we refer to as a moral hazard effect. The mortgagee response to this moral hazard effect is as indicated by the ex ante risk pricing relation between the LTV-ratio and risk pricing, lifting the mortgage rate (A ! B). The moral hazard effect impacts positively on the mortgage rate, but the risk pricing effect is still derived from the risk pricing regime at origination.
The second and the third effect are the ones that alter the relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio. These two effects create a kinked-relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio ex post, as risk pricing is entering a more aggressive regime. The second effect 1 ¡ p
, which is a regime effect, is due to a higher (lower) probability of default (success). The regime effect increases the probability of default and puts more weight to the part of the profit function related to collateral. The third effect a 1 C a = Þ ð is due to a higher amount of non-collateralised debt and increased costs in case of default, and is referred to as a debt effect. The combination of the debt effect and the regime effect creates a default effect that lifts a mortgagee's loss given default and, thereby influences risk pricing. The default effect creates a kinked-relation between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate, as risk pricing is more aggressive ex post than ex ante. Figure 3 shows how a higher LTV-ratio λ new D λ initial ð1 C aÞ has three effects on the mortgage rate: A moral hazard effect A ! B, a debt effect B ! C and a regime effect C ! D. When thinking about the latter two we see how the house price fall, and the corresponding increase in the LTV-ratio, exclusively determines the debt effect, while the regime effect is related to both the elasticity of success and to the house price fall, and is thus highly context-specific. We have drawn Figure 3 for the case where the debt effect exceeds the regime effect, i.e. a > 1 ¡ p p 1 s P .
Summary and discussion
There is empirical evidence that LTV-ratios vary across markets and periods. Both the demand and the supply sides of mortgage markets contribute to variations in the LTV-ratio. The supply side contribution to changes in LTV-ratios is often argued in relation to improved credit scoring-and risk pricing technology. This paper relates the LTV-ratio to the risk exposure of a mortgagee. It applies a standardised framework for a profit-maximising mortgagee to derive the optimal LTV-ratio and the risk pricing response to a housing depreciation increasing mortgagee risk.
First, the paper derives the optimal LTV-ratio for a mortgagee that supplies mortgages using housing as collateral. We benchmark our argument using a profitmaximising mortgagee funding mortgages by own equity. For this mortgagee, the optimal LTV-ratio is one where the mortgagee is paid for its actual risk exposure. Introducing welfare considerations in our supply side framework, we find the socially optimal LTV-ratio to equal the profit-maximising LTV-ratio.
Abstracting away from mortgage demand the paper highlights impacts on the LTV-ratio from the supply side of mortgage markets. The LTV-ratio is related to the equity stake a mortgagor has in a house, and, naturally, lower equity (and a higher LTV-ratio) increases the probability of default. Seeing the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee LTV variations might be due to a number of factors, of which few are consistent with a view that the (inverse of-) LTV-ratio may be seen as an indicator of how mature a mortgage market is.
For a mortgagee that attracts external capital the optimal LTV-ratio exceeds the socially-optimal LTV-ratio. When levelling the playing field and introducing different mortgage market characteristics, we argue that the LTV-ratio is affected by deposit insurance and capital adequacy, moral hazard and risk pricing as well as lending volumes and collateral values. Several of these arguments, and the variations in the LTV-ratio they create, do not stem from improved credit-scoring technology or more correct pricing of credit risk. Rather, they represent the opposite: increased risk taking by mortgagees, or institutional arrangements protecting mortgagees from their actual risk exposure.
Highlighting supply side characteristics the paper shows how the supply side of mortgage markets might have been a key driver in the period preceding the financial crisis where LTV-ratios rose to record highs. In the aftermath of the crisis macro-prudential interventions, both related to credit-and capital instruments have come into place. 13 While credit-related instruments such as LTV-caps are direct tools, capitalrelated instruments are more indirect. The model shows rather straightforwardly how capital-adequacy rules can reduce the wedge between the profit maximising LTVratio and the socially-optimal LTV-ratio. In fact, when we consider our optimal LTV-ratios (as given by expressions 9, 13 and 17, respectively) the paper shows how stricter capital-adequacy ratios reduce the funding effect, the lending effect and the collateral effect, pushing the profit maximising LTV-ratio towards the optimal LTVratio for society from a supply side perspective.
The paper shows how external funding and problems related to asymmetric information and moral hazard, as well as an endogenous credit constraint allowing for collateral effects in mortgage markets, might allow mortgagees to take on too much risk and supply too high LTV-ratios when compared to a supply side perspective on social welfare.
Second, the paper considers the risk pricing response to housing depreciation and an LTV-ratio that exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination. We show how risk pricing ex post differs from that ex ante, as risk pricing is more aggressive ex post. A shock to the LTV-ratio creates a moral hazard effect, a debt effect and a regime effect on risk pricing. The latter two create a default effect that impacts the risk pricing response to a higher LTV-ratio ex post. The default effect is not priced in by the mortgagee ex ante and produces a kinked-relation between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate ex post. The more aggressive risk pricing regime that comes about ex post is in accordance with risk pricing terminology.
Notes 1. See also Campbell and Cocco (2003) or Cocco (2005) for the role of housing in household's portfolio risk and Hryso et al (2010) for house prices and the risk exposure of households. 2. See Borgersen (2015b) -and the references -for the relation between mortgage demand and the LTV-ratio. 3. The seminal paper by Jackson and Kasserman (1980) distinguishes between two basic views on mortgage default, the equity theory of default and the ability-to-pay theory of default, respectively. 4. See the references in Park and Bang (2014) for the loss severity of mortgagee exposure. 5. This framework separates the lending from the collateral effect, in order to analyse the two effects separately. The alternative would be to integrate the two, making the mortgage volume a function of collateral, which again is related to the LTV-ratio LðV ðλÞÞ where L 0 ðV Þ > 0 and V 0 ðλÞ > 0:
6. While our argument is related to moral hazard, differences in, for instance, household income, and hence debt-servicing ability could alternatively be applied to argue for different LTV-ratios. For a discussion of mortgagor characteristics and mortgagee risk see, for instance, Diaz-Serrano (2004) or Leece (2004) . 7. Our model gives a conventional role to both external funding in general and capital-adequacy more specifically. This allows for a straightforward argumentation regarding the impact of external funding on the LTV-ratio. While deposit insurance impacts positively, is the impact from tighter capital adequacy rules on the LTV-ratio negative. See for instance Anginer et al (2014) for a general discussion on deposit guarantee schemes and VanHoose (2007) for a survey of the (theoretical) literature on capital ratios. 8. The moral hazard technology is represented by the probability function p D pðλÞ; p 0 ðλÞ < 0 and equal moral hazard technology equates the probability function, which implies that the elasticity of success (the moral hazard elasticity) s p D λ p ðλÞ Á p 0 ðλÞ À only differs with respect to the LTV-ratio itself, when comparing scenarios A and B. 9. Alternatively, we may express the condition for a positive lending effect in terms of a maximum value for the lending elasticity 1 1 ¡ pru = 1 ¡ p ð Þ > s L . When p D 0 inelastic lending, s L < 1, is the condition for a positive lending effect. When p > 0 is a positive lending effect compatible with elastic lending s L > 1. 10. The lending effect is determined by the parenthesis in expression 13), which may be expressed as V D L C E. When pðr u L ¡ r D DÞ we see that r u eliminates the lending effect while λ D L V does the same when λV . 11. When shifting from an ex ante to an ex post scenario, we keep ð1 ¡ pÞð ¡ L C λV Þ as neither lending volumes nor collateral values would respond positively to a fall in house prices ex post. 12. The reasoning of the model implies symmetric effects in the sense that p D pðλÞ creates a situation with a lower probability of default and a reduced cost of default, which, analogue to the case of depreciations, will have implications for risk pricing during periods of appreciations. 13. See, for instance, Gelati and Moessner (2011) or Lim et al (2011) for a review of the literature on Macroprudential Policy and Taylor (2009) for a discussion of the policy response(s) to the financial crisis.
